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PETITION FOR REHEARING

In

its May

25, 1990 Opinion, this Court overlooked

or

misapprehended numerous Utah Supreme Court decisions — especially
those governing the marshaling doctrine, the legal principle on
which the Court so heavily relied in the Opinion.

In this

extremely significant case, involving hundreds of thousands of
dollars, this Court reached a tremendously inequitable result by
failing to consider at all scores of legal authorities which compel
a reversal of the trial court's judgment as a matter of law,
irrespective of the correctness of the trial court's findings.
This Court abdicated its duty —
Court decisions —
raised.

imposed by numerous Utah Supreme

to address the legal arguments White Pine

If a rehearing is not granted, the Court —

considering Appellants' legal arguments —

without ever

will have affirmed a

judgment that is erroneous as a matter of law, and economically
disastrous for the Appellants.

In the face of contrary Utah

Supreme Court decisions, this Court will also have announced a new
and incorrect standard of appellate review.
I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

This Court failed to recognize the extensive legal issues
before it, and addressed Appellants' (collectively "White Pine")
arguments as if they presented only issues of fact.

Without

addressing a single legal argument raised by the parties, this
Court, without

any discussion, affirmed

the

following

legal

conclusions of the trial court:
Appellees (the "Sharps") did not breach the parties'
contract by failing to reconvey property under a trust
2

deed, even though White Pine had paid for it and the
parties' contract required the reconveyances as payments
were made.
-

The Sharps' legally reconveyed the Property by signing
a document consenting to the recording of a plat of the
Property even though it contains no conveyance, release,
or granting language.

-

The Sharps' breach of contract was legally excused by
their reliance upon advice of counsel.
The Sharps were excused from their contractual obligation
to reconvey because White Pine, after paying for the
property, failed to request the reconveyance of specific
property prior to White Pine's
default under the
contract.
White Pine was not entitled to the legal remedy of
receiving specific reconveyances of property for which
White Pine had expressly contracted with, and paid, the
Sharps; instead, the Sharps were entitled to retain the
substantial sums paid for the reconveyances and to
foreclose their lien on the property they were obligated
to reconvey.

-

White Pine first breached the contract by failing to pay
approximately $3,200.00 in real estate taxes even though
White Pine had paid more than $1,500,000.00 to the Sharps
under the Contract.

-

The Sharps — as trust deed beneficiaries — legally
granted an easement to themselves over a roadway owned
by White Pine.

Despite
authority —

the

parties'

extensive

briefing

of

controlling

and relevant authority from other jurisdictions

—

this Court failed to address any of the legal arguments because it
concluded those issues
strike at the trial court's determination of whether
there was a material breach of contract, and if so, when,
and by whom. Such questions constitute issues of fact
for the fact finder.
Opinion, p. 5.

These are not issues of fact.

Rather, they are

issues of law which this Court is required to address.

3

II.

Issues Of Breach And Performance
Circumstances. Questions of Fact.

Are

Not,

Under

These

The Opinion suggests this Court affirmed the trial court
because questions of breach "constitute issues of fact for the fact
finder."

This proposition, however, is directly contrary to

controlling Utah law.
In Avaikos v. Lowrv, 54 Utah 217, 179 P. 988 (Utah 1919),
plaintiff/seller sued defendant/buyer for unpaid amounts allegedly
owing under two contracts for the delivery of wool.

Defendant

admitted the contracts and that he had only paid a specified amount
thereunder, but asserted a counterclaim alleging the plaintiff
failed to deliver the total amount specified.
All claims went to trial before a jury, which returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount.

Defendant

appealed on three bases, including: (1) that the trial court erred
in submitting to the jury the question of whether the amount of
wool delivered

substantially

complied with the contract; and

(2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
substantial compliance was a question of fact.

id. at 989-90.

In reversing the jury award, the Supreme Court held that
where, as here, the facts are undisputed, "the question of whether
or not they constitute a performance or a breach of the contract
is one of law for the Court."
1011).

Id. at 90 (quoting 13 C.J. 790 para.

Since the sufficiency of the amount of wool delivered
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presented a question of law, the Supreme Court concluded that it
was error to submit that issue to the jury. Id.
Avgikos, then, represents the only controlling Utah authority,
and it is directly contrary to this Court's statement that issues
of breach and substantial performance are questions of fact. Those
issues are issues of law, when, as here, the facts are undisputed
or presumed to be correct.
III. EVEN IF FACTS ARE CHALLINGED ON APPEAL. THIS COURT HAS A DUTY
TO CONSIDER THE PARTIES' LEGAL ARGUMENTS.
In its analysis, this Court mistakenly overlooked, and failed
to

apply

correctly,

two

separate

lines

of

controlling

authority which conclusively establish either that

Utah

(1) none of the

foregoing issues presents a question of fact; or (2) even if White
Pine

did

fail

to marshal

evidence

respectfully submits is erroneous —

—

a

ruling

White

Pine

this court nevertheless has

a duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied the law.
A.

The Interpretation Of An Unambiguous Document Is A Question
Of Law: The Construction Of A Document Is Always A Question
Of Law,
The briefs in this case make abundantly clear that the rights

and obligations of the parties were governed by a July 16, 1981
Memorandum of Closing Terms ("Closing Memorandum") (Ex. D-15); a
Trust Deed Note (Ex. D-3); a Trust Deed (Ex. D-2); and a Warranty
Deed (Ex. D-17) (collectively, the "Contract").
Of all the Contract documents, the trial court found only the
phrase "pro rata cost to the purchaser", contained in paragraph 7

5

of the Closing Memorandum, to be ambiguous,

(C. 16). The trial

court accordingly permitted extrinsic evidence to interpret that
phrase, but made no finding that extrinsic evidence was necessary
to interpret any other portion of the Contract.1 None of the trial
court's

legal conclusions, which this Court

affirmed without

analysis in its Opinion, involves that phrase.
Accordingly, the various breach issues on appeal involve
unambiguous contractual language. The trial court's interpretation
of such unambiguous

language is to be accorded no deference on

appeal, but reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Assoc. , 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714
P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716
(Utah 1985); Bradshaw v. Burninqham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1983);
Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Crowther v. Carter,
767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co.
v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App. 1987).
Moreover, regardless of why the trial court admitted extrinsic
evidence, such extrinsic evidence is admitted

1

solely for the

In a rambling footnote at page xii of their Brief, the
Sharps claim the Closing Memorandum "ambiguous". The transcript
page cited by the Sharps (Tr. 733) indicates only that "based upon
para. 7 at least and potentially more" the trial court would
continue to hear testimony regarding the Closing Memorandum's
terms. In its conclusions, however, the trial court concluded in
the last analysis that only para. 7 was ambiguous; and the trial
court considered extrinsic evidence only to interpret para. 7. (C.
16). Every other citation in the Sharps' footnote goes to the
easement question, not to the breach issues central to this appeal.
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purpose of interpreting the terms of an ambiguous contract.

Once

a contract has been interpreted, however, the construction of that
contract "is always reviewed as a law issue."

Fashion Fabrics of

Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 25 (la. 1978)
(emphasis added).
Consequently,

to the extent Contract

provisions must be

construed at all, questions involving (1) the Sharps' duty to
reconvey; (2) the legal effectiveness of their purported reconveyances; (3) the effect of White Pine's failure to make specific
requests;

(4) White Pine's entitlement to the legal remedy of

receiving specific reconveyances for which White Pine had already
paid the Sharps; and (5) whether the Sharps —
interest —

who owned no fee

were able to grant an easement to themselves, are all

questions of law to be resolved de novo by this Court.
B.

To the Extent White Pine Challenges Findings. Those Findings
are Irrelevant to the Breach Issues Central to This Appeal:
Failure to Marshal Does not Relieve this Court of its Duty to
Determine (1) If the Findings Support the Conclusions, or
(2) Whether Those Conclusions Can Be Sustained Under Any Set
of Facts,
1.

White Pine Challenged Only Findings Unrelated to the
Breach and Reconveyance Issues,

White Pine did challenge some of the trial court's findings.2
2

White Pine challenges (1) Finding No. 91 that the Sharps
relied on the advice of counsel (Appellants' Brief ("AB") 22-24;
Reply Brief ("RB") 23-24); (2) the findings pertaining to
attorneys' fees (AB 47-48); and (3) the trial court's finding of
market value (RB 12-13). Similarly, White Pine argues there is
not evidence in the record to support certain legal conclusions
made by the trial court (RB 20-21, 24). Obviously, it is
impossible to marshal evidence when none exists. The only possible
marshaling would be a citation to the entire trial transcript. An
7

None of these challenged findings, however, has any bearing on the
breach and reconveyance issues central to this appeal.

No matter

how much evidence may or may not support the trial court's
findings, this Court must nevertheless determine if the findings
support the legal conclusions challenged in this appeal.
2.

The Court Misapplied the Marshaling Doctrine and Overlooked Its Duty to Determine Whether the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact Support Its Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, or If The Trial Court Applied Erroneous
Principles of Law,

The marshaling doctrine provides:
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evidence
in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings.
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Unless the

facts are marshaled, a trial court's findings of fact will not be
disturbed. Id. Accordingly, in Scharf, where the appellant failed
to marshal the evidence, the Supreme Court accepted the lower
court's findings of fact.

See, Id.

Of critical importance, however, the Scharf court did not
merely affirm the judgment at that point; instead, it proceeded to
consider and address appellant's specific challenges to the trial
court's conclusions of law.

Id.

Thus, even where an appellant

fails to marshal the evidence below, an appellate court still has

appellant simply cannot marshal the negative.
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a duty to examine "whether the trial court's findings of fact
support its conclusions of law and judgment."

Sampson v. Richins,

770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1988) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this duty,
implicit in all the marshaling cases, to examine legal argument
irrespective of the failure to marshal. For example, in Ashton v.
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), the appellant failed to marshal
all evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact and thus
accepted

those

findings.

Id. at

150.

The court, however,

immediately thereafter acknowledged its "duty . . . to determine
whether those findings [justified] the trial court's conclusion of
law,"

and

correctness.

then

independently

reviewed

that

conclusion

for

Id.3

The following cases demonstrate the two-step nature of the
required analysis:

When an appellant fails to marshal evidence,

the trial court's findings are presumed correct.
Utah v. Harrison,

122 U.A.R. 32, 34

See, State of

(Utah App. 1989).

The

presumption is that the findings are supported by competent and
sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const.

3

The Utah Supreme Court has applied this principle even where
an appellant failed to provide the Supreme Court with any trial
transcript. See, e.g., Powell v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1128
(Utah 1975); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383,
490 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1971). In both of those cases, the Supreme
Court presumed that the trial court's findings were based upon
competent and substantial evidence, and then automatically
proceeded to determine whether those findings supported the trial
court's conclusions of law. Id.

9

Co. , 701 P.2d 1078, 1085, n. 2 (Utah 1985).

When "findings are

supported by competent evidence, they will not be disturbed by the
reviewing court, but if erroneous principles of law are applied to
the facts, as they were in this case, judgment on such facts will
not

be

upheld

on

review."

Survey

Eng'rs

Inc. v.

Zoline

Foundation. 532 P.2d 748, 751 (Colo. App. 1975) (emphasis added),
rev'd on other grounds, 546 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1976).
The

Indiana

Court

of

Appeals

succinctly

described

the

appropriate two-step analytical process on appeal:
[T]his Court will employ a two-tier standard of review.
First, it must be determined the evidence supports the
findings.
Then the Court must conclude the findings
support the judgment.
Keystone Square Shopping Center Co. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.,
459 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind. App. 1984) (emphasis added).
This is the analytical process White Pine followed in its
briefs.4

Moreover, it is precisely the approach this Court used

4

For example, in its treatment of finding no. 47, White Pine
argued the trial court's conclusion that White Pine had established
a "practice" could not be sustained, as a matter of law, in light
of the trial court's unchallenged finding no. 28 that White Pine
had only made a single request for reconveyance. (AB 25, RB 4-5).
In making this argument to the Court, White Pine wrote that "the
court's own findings (and omitted findings) concerning requests
preclude a determination that there was a ^practice' of making
v
timely' requests for the release of property." This is a direct
challenge to a legal conclusion, not to a finding, and this Court
has a duty to address that legal argument. In this regard, to the
extent Finding No. 47 found a "practice" to exist, it is in reality
a question of law. An appellate court is free to disregard the
trial court's designation of "findings" and "conclusions", and is
free to recharacterize the trial court's statements in a proper
manner. See, Smith v. Maldonado, 103 N.M. 570, 711 P.2d 15, 17
(1985); Maloha Village v. Kanar Elec. Co, Ltd.. 593 P.2d 375, 384
(Hawaii 1979) ("A conclusion of law is not rendered immune from
10

in addressing the issue of attorneys' fees. Opinion at 6-7. White
Pine directly challenged the evidence regarding their reasonableness.

This Court, however, did not refuse to reach the underlying

legal issues.

Rather, it engaged in detailed legal analysis

notwithstanding White Pine's

failure to marshal

supporting the finding of reasonableness.

all evidence

This Court should have

used this same approach on all legal issues, not merely on the
isolated attorneys' fee issue.
By failing to use this two-tiered analytical process, this
Court precluded the appellate review of purely legal issues.

For

example, White Pine argued that, as a matter of law, White Pine is
still entitled to a reconveyance of the property for which it paid.
(AB 14-19; RB 8-14, citing e.g., Columbia Dev., Inc. v. Watchie,
448 P.2d 360 (Ore. 1968); Burroughs v. Garner, 405 A.2d 301 (Md.
App. 1979); Eldridge v. Burns, 76 Cal. App.3d 396, 142 Cal Rptr.
845

(1978); Leisure Campground

& Country Club Ltd. Pship. v.

Leisure Estates, 372 A.2d 595 (Md. App. 1977)). White Pine argued
that it was entitled to this remedy notwithstanding any of the
trial court's findings, including its finding that White Pine first
breached

the parties' contract.

This Court, however, never

considered the issue of White Pine's legal entitlement to this
remedy.

Thus, in effect, the Opinion transformed the marshaling

review because labeled a finding of fact.").
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doctrine into a doctrine of waiver by its requirement that legal
argument will not be addressed if the facts are not marshaled, even
if those facts are fundamentally irrelevant to legal issues on
appeal. White Pine respectfully submits this Court did not intend
that result.5
IV.

CONCLUSION

A Petition for Rehearing is appropriate when the appellate
court has overlooked or misapprehended particular points of law.
This Court's Opinion overlooks or misapplies three fundamental
legal

principles:

(1) questions

of

breach

and

substantial

performance are questions of law for the court when, as here, the
5

The "advice of counsel" issue also illustrates this unjust
and inappropriate foreclosure of legal argument.
White Pine
argued, as a matter of law, that reliance on a counsel's advice is
no defense to a breach of contract action. (AB 22, citing, Mann
v. Glens Falls Inc. Co., 418 F.Supp. 237, 251 (D. Nev. 1974)).
White Pine argued that no matter what the facts are, advice of
counsel provides no defense to a breach of contract action.
Because of its one-step analysis, however, the court will never
reach such legal issues.
Consider further, for example, a situation where (1) the trial
court made 15 findings in an action where the sole defense was the
statute of frauds; (2) none of those findings found a writing
sufficient to take the alleged transaction out of the statute of
frauds; and (3) the appellant never ordered a transcript because
his sole issue on appeal was that the trial court erred as a matter
of law in finding the contract to be enforceable despite the
absence of a required writing. Obviously, the appellant would not
have to marshal any evidence supporting challenged findings in
order to argue on appeal that, in their totality, the findings
could not support the legal conclusion. Nevertheless, under the
Opinion, an appellant now must marshal all evidence regarding
irrelevant findings as a condition precedent to having its legal
arguments considered.
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facts are undisputed or presumed correct; (2) the interpretation
of an unambiguous document presents only questions of law, and the
construction of a document is always a legal issue; and (3) the
marshaling doctrine applies only when findings are challenged, and
in any event does not eliminate an appellate court's duty to review
for correctness the trial court's application of the law to the
findings made.
If a rehearing is not granted, this Court will have affirmed
the trial court's judgment without ever addressing whether the
trial court properly applied principles of law.

That result,

contrary to controlling authority, is economically disastrous to
White Pine, which, according to the trial court's judgment, must
suffer a forfeiture in a project costing more than 2.7 million
dollars, because White Pine was late in paying

$3,200.00 in

property taxes. Such consequences, among serious ones obvious from
the arguments made on appeal, underscore the responsbility of this
Court to address the legal arguments made in this case.
Moreover, if a rehearing is not granted, and White Pine's
legal issues are not addressed, the Court's Opinion will establish
a new and inappropriate condition for appellate review:

all

appellants will have to marshal all evidence to support all
findings the appellants anticipate the appellate court may feel are
disputed in order to avoid waiving their right to have their purely
legal arguments considered.

This Court should not turn the

marshaling requirement into a waiver doctrine.
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